I don't entirely agree with the conclusion of RBR presented here, although I do agree with the historical facts regarding the German and Japanese experiences. Some other points that are worth mentioning. It was noted last year before the occupation began that the number of occupying soldiers per capita in Germany was more than 5x that of Iraq today. That made control of potential insurgent forces much easier. Also, Germany was well and truly defeated both institutionally and physically. It is instructive that within one year of the "defeat" of Iraq, al-Sadr has an organized and well-supplied militia largely unconnected to the previous Ba'athist government. Such a thing could not have happened in Germany. So, I think we are facing the problem that we haven't invested the time or resources in order to be able to occupy the country peacefully for 5 years or so while they build democratic institutions.

And that's just the monetary and force issue. The larger issue is one of ideology and war. During WWII, we defeated fascism and delegitimized it as a political force outside of Alabama. We also lopped off the left end of the spectrum in the post-war anticommunist push. Thus, the only political space in Germany was centrist. By contrast, we barely even understand Iraqi politics, much less have we de-legitimized whole segments of it. Not only have we failed to use the money or military force to accomplish de-Ba'athification, but we also haven't even articulated what it is.

This should not be surprising. The problem with the Iraq/Germany analogy is facially obvious. We didn't liberate Germany; we conquered it. We cannot both conquer and liberate Iraq. We aren't sure which one we're doing. The result is that we are failed conquerors, and we have "liberated" religious fanaticism.

Mark my word: we will soon be allying with ex-Ba'athists against Shi'a and Sunni radicals. And as with those who aided the White Russians in 1918, we will not understand why we failed.