Bell Curve The Law Talking Guy Raised by Republicans U.S. West
Well, he's kind of had it in for me ever since I accidentally ran over his dog. Actually, replace "accidentally" with "repeatedly," and replace "dog" with "son."

Saturday, December 03, 2005

Saving Face in The Arab World

This started as a response to LTG's previous post, "Squandering an Opportunity" and as I started thinking about things, I decided to invite a little controversy. What provoked my thinking is LTG's statement about the Iraqi government wanting us to stay so that we can fight the Sunni's for them. I think that is a valid argument and it made me think about U.S. relations throughout the region.

My comments here are based on 1) what happened with Saddam in the past; 2) what is going on between Syria and the UN right now; 3) my own personal experiences with Arabs; 4) my own studies of cross cultural communication and its effect on international policy making. I will be generalizing here and I know the danger that comes with this. And I know that many political scientists are skeptical of personality studies of world leaders and their effect on policy. But as a political scientist and an observer of and participant in decision-making, I think it is shortsighted to leave cultural and social factors aside. So for the sake of argument, stick with me


To put it in a nutshell, American policy makers and negotiators start with the premise that there is a problem to be solved and that there is a way to solve it. Arabs start with the premise that there is a problem to be solved, and probably no way to solve it that would benefit them personally as much as the status quo. In addition, saving face is the priority- keeping up appearances, appearing cooperative, unified, and harmonious in their negotiations. From the American perspective, then, Arabs don't appear to start from the base of honesty or integrity. They over personalize everything; they get offended in unpredictable way due to their hyper sensitivity; they rarely come with viable solutions but are quick to denounce the solutions of others; and they say one thing in public and the opposite one-on-one in private. It's all smoke in mirrors, creating confusion for the U.S. policymaker.

From the Arab perspectives, Americans are arrogant with their plans, pushy with their over-confidence, naive in their worldview, imprisoned by their goal-driven timetables, and quite impersonal. This is no doubt frustrating for both parities. As an American, I can tell you that when dealing with this type of thing in a work setting is emotionally and intellectually exhausting, and it feels like you're pushing a wet noodle up a very steep hill. No matter what you try to do to solve a problem, you are wrong. Sisyphus had it easy by comparison.

I lay all that out in the hope of perhaps explaining in some way the challenge U.S. policy makers faced in dealing with Iraq. One of Saddam's talents was his ability to play the U.S. He knew how to keep us anxious- alternating cooperation with resistance. He would welcome the inspectors one day, saying he had nothing to hide, but then to save face, he'd have to keep them locked out of certain places. (This isn't isolated to the Arab world either. The North Koreans play the same game.) He knew that Americans wanted to solve problems and get concessions, which required his cooperation. He knew how to take advantage of that. I can understand why at a certain point someone in the Beltway said, "Let's take this guy out and so he can't mess with us anymore!"

Saddam was widely admired in the region for kicking sand in the face of the U.S., something other Arab countries didn't dare to do. So he was trapped in a way as well. He couldn't really cooperate to end sanctions because he had a reputation to protect. No matter how clear it was to the U.S. and the U.N what he needed to do to get the sanctions lifted, it was never clear to him, or so he pretended. In the end, it looked like he was always one step ahead of the U.S./ UN. while he waited out the sanctions and made overtures to the Europeans.

Now let's look at Syria. Syria was implicated in the assassination of Hariri. The UN launched an investigation, in which Syria refused to participate. Then this week, a key witness, Hassam Taher Hassam, comes out on Syrian state TV, and says he that the Hariri family offered him bribes by to give false testimony to the UN investigators. The Hariri family denies this, of course. Thus, Syria is now working hard to discredit the UN probe. It is a classic stalling stunt- similar to what we saw with Saddam and weapons inspectors. Syria has been found out and it has to save face. So did it force Mr. Taher Hassam to change his mind about his testimony? Wouldn't the same thing happen if we took witnesses off to Switzerland to interview? Wouldn't they just return home and have the thumb screws applied? How do you win against that? You don't. And we won't in Iraq either.

I agree with my fellow bloggers and the likes of Rep. Murtha. We have done our job in Iraq. We have delivered what we promised- a democratically elected government. We have made huge mistakes in Iraq and many bad decisions. But at this point, if the country is a mess, it isn't solely the fault of the U.S. military. Insurgents, and local warlords, both Iraqis and others have contributed a great deal. We've tried rebuilding pipelines only to have them exploded by insurgents. We've tried supplying hospitals only to have suicide bombers blow them up. We've constructed new, free market places for merchants only to have local sheiks charge exorbitant prices for the stalls. At a certain point, enough is enough. And I am sure that many of the things Bush said we have done, we have. The tools have been given to the Iraqis. And they seem ready take responsibility. Iraqi government officials and representatives meeting in Cairo in November asked for a timtable for US troop withdaw. I hope the call was sincere and not another face-saving device.

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