tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6762928.post112663952413352012..comments2024-01-03T05:23:36.046-08:00Comments on The Citizens: Why a Supreme Court Justice is not an UmpireUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6762928.post-1126652477456501742005-09-13T16:01:00.000-07:002005-09-13T16:01:00.000-07:00Here, for another perspective on judging, is the (...Here, for another perspective on judging, is the (<B>entire</B> ) dissent of the late Justice Blackmun in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). It is one of the most famous in modern court history for its abandonment of traditional "judicial" rhetoric. I think Judge Roberts loathes it. I find it extremely moving as a statement of what the law is meant to be.<BR/><BR/>JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. <BR/><BR/>Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by "natural sympathy." Ante, at 202. But, in this pretense, the Court itself retreats into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the legal norms that should apply to those facts. As JUSTICE BRENNAN demonstrates, the facts here involve not mere passivity, but active state intervention in the life of Joshua DeShaney - intervention that triggered a fundamental duty to aid the boy once the State learned of the severe danger to which he was exposed. <BR/><BR/>The Court fails to recognize this duty because it attempts to draw a sharp and rigid line between action and inaction. But such formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, I submit that these Clauses were designed, at least in part, to undo the formalistic legal reasoning that infected antebellum jurisprudence, which the late Professor Robert Cover analyzed so effectively in his significant work entitled Justice Accused (1975). <BR/><BR/>Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves, see id., at 119-121, the Court today claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled by existing legal doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented by this case [489 U.S. 189, 213] is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a "sympathetic" reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging. Cf. A. Stone, Law, Psychiatry, and Morality 262 (1984) ("We will make mistakes if we go forward, but doing nothing can be the worst mistake. What is required of us is moral ambition. Until our composite sketch becomes a true portrait of humanity we must live with our uncertainty; we will grope, we will struggle, and our compassion may be our only guide and comfort"). <BR/><BR/>Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, ante, at 193, "dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files." It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles - so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about "liberty and justice for all" - that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded. Joshua and his mother, as petitioners here, deserve - but now are denied by this Court - the opportunity to have the facts of their case considered in the light of the constitutional protection that 42 U.S.C. 1983 is meant to provide. [489 U.S. 189, 214] <BR/><BR/> <BR/><BR/><A></A><A></A>// posted by<A><B> </B></A>LTGAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6762928.post-1126650989212475692005-09-13T15:36:00.000-07:002005-09-13T15:36:00.000-07:00http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/carlin.html This...<A HREF="http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/carlin.html" REL="nofollow">http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/carlin.html</A> <BR/><BR/>This is a bit George Carlin has on the differences between baseball and football. The text obviously leaves out his delivery, which I recommend everyone should get around to listening to. <BR/><BR/>For the record, as the t-shirt says, Baseball isn't boring, you are. <BR/><BR/><A></A><A></A>// posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://thecitizens.blogspot.com/2005/09/why-supreme-court-justice-is-not.html#comments" REL="nofollow" TITLE="Siddharthawolf at gmail dot com">Siddharthawolf</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6762928.post-1126649739492639772005-09-13T15:15:00.000-07:002005-09-13T15:15:00.000-07:00I think judges are more like the "judges" of olymp...I think judges are more like the "judges" of olympic ice dancing or something (which is a "women's sport"). But saying "a judge is like a judge" is a little unsatisfying rhetorically. <BR/><BR/><A></A><A></A>// posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://thecitizens.blogspot.com/" REL="nofollow" TITLE="">Raised By Republicans</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6762928.post-1126640316043672382005-09-13T12:38:00.000-07:002005-09-13T12:38:00.000-07:00"Judge Roberts did not call himself a tennis line ..."Judge Roberts did not call himself a tennis line judge--that does not send the right class or gender signals."<BR/><BR/>Excellent deconstruction of Judge Roberts' testimony! Nice job. You might also mention that inappropriate or misleading "war" metaphors are used a lot by conservatives as well.Dr. Strangelovehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14407042105777411150noreply@blogger.com